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Introduction 
Everyone agrees that the world’s population will 
exceed 8 billion people by 2025, an increase of over 2.5 
billion in the next thirty years. Everyone agrees that 
most of the increase will occur in developing country 
cities-urban population is expected to rise from 1 
billion in 1985 to 4 billion by 2025. Most everyone 
agrees that world food supplies will have to more than 
double by 2025, because of increases in income and 
urbanization. in addition to population growth. 
Given this widespread agreement on the needs or 
demand side of the equation and its magnitude-the 
greatest numerical growth in human numbers in his- 
tory and a required magnitude of increased food pro- 
duction never before achieved-why is there so little 
agreement on the ease or difficulty of generating the 
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supply to meet that demand? The spectrum of views 
ranges from the one extreme, “there is no problem,” to 
the other, “the imminent arrival of the Malthusian night- 
mare, unless effective population control is implemented 
immediately.” By far the predominance of views is to- 
ward the “no problem” end, and can only be character- 
ized as bordering on complacency. 
Therefore, the puzzle that this lecture identifies is, 
how can intelligent students of the international food 
economy agree so closely on the demand side and dis- 
agree so wildly on the capacity of the world to provide 
the supply to meet that demand? The cacophony of 
views is muddying the waters and, in my view, retard- 
ing needed attention to this critical issue. 
This lecture has a modest objective. It is to criti- 
cally appraise the competing viewpoints and to show 
that, regardless of which view you prefer, the produc- 
tivity improvement challenge facing world agriculture 
in the next thirty years is enormous. Twenty twenty- 
five is just thirty years away. From initiation to imple- 
mentation in farmers’ fields, agricultural research takes 
ten to twenty years to have an impact. Twenty years 
from now there will be at least 1.8 billion more people 
in the world to feed. Research and technology devel- 
opment to contribute to the needed production must 
start today. Everyday spent on further debate about 
whether “Malthus must wait” or “Malthus is finally right” 
is “fiddling while Rome bums.” 
Specifically, I shall do five things. First, I will 
review briefly the past history of ‘food crises” debates. 
Second, I will quickly summarize the demand side upon 
which most people agree. Third, I will summarize four 
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different viewpoints on the supply side of the world 
food equation;from the “no problem” view, as exempli- 
fied by Donald 0. Mitchell and Merlinda D. Ingco in 
their paper entitled “The World Food Outlook,” to the 
ominous predictions of Lester R. Brown and Hal Kane 
in their book, Full House: Reassessing the Earth’s 
Population Carrying Capacity. Fourth, I will critically 
appraise the consequences of each of these scenarios 
for future agricultural development and technology 
generation needs. Finally, I will focus on the conse- 
quences of not recognizing the urgency of the produc- 
tivity challenge. 
Past Debates 
The sufficiency of future food supplies has been a 
recurrent question in the international debate over most 
of the post-World War II period. The debate is most 
frequently driven by supply side considerations. Since 
Thomas Malthus wrote his “Essay on the Principle of 
Population as It Affects the Future Improvement of 
Society” in 1798, the debate has focused on the race 
between supply (seen to grow linearly) and population 
(seen to grow exponentially). New lands, new technol- 
ogy, and capital investment in irrigation have delayed 
the “Malthusian cross” (i.e. when population growth 
rates exceed the rate of food supply increases) for most 
of the world, but the debate, for how long?, has raged 
for years. 
Immediately after World War II, there were con- 
cerns about imminent food shortages. These quickly 
gave way to food production surges and rising stocks 
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in the 1950s and early 1960s. Two bad monsoons in 
South Asia during 1965-66 led to resurgent concerns 
about imminent famine. William and Paul Paddock 
wrote a best seller in this period called Famine- 1975!, 
which predicted imminent famine by 1975. In the late 
1960s and early 197Os, Malthus was kept at bay again 
by expanded output. The years 1972 to 1974 saw a 
coincidence of events-production shortfalls in several 
locations simultaneously and rapid demand expansion, 
particularly from the Soviet Union, which caused agri- 
cultural prices to skyrocket. Grain prices tripled over 
an eight-month period. Global food shortages were 
predicted. Then U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Earl 
Butz, exhorted farmers to “plant fencerow to fencerow.” 
Surpluses rebuilt in the early 1980s. The United 
States instituted its most comprehensive and expen- 
sive supply control program, Payment in Kind (PIK), in 
1983 as stocks soared. The 1988 drought brought a 
brief return of the issue of possible shortages, but 
concerns about excess supplies soon cooled the de- 
bate, at least in developed countries. Mitchell and 
Ingco, in their recent paper, extensively reviewed pre- 
vious chapters of this debate and concluded that tech- 
nological pessimists have always been wrong. 
Currently, the food production versus population 
growth issue is the subject of some debate, but the 
issue is not viewed as critical, even though there are 
widely divergent views on what the next twenty to thirty 
years will hold regarding the world’s capacity to in- 
crease production to feed more than 8 billion people. 
I will return to four of these widely divergent views 
in a moment, but first let me quickly review the de- 
mand side that most people agree on. 
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World Food Needs to 2025- 
The Convergent View 
World population will double in the next forty years. 
By 2025-thirty-one years from now-the median vari- 
ant of projections by the United Nations suggests a 
global population of 8.5 billion people. A larger share 
of that population will live in developing countries. In 
1985, 75 percent of the world’s population lived in 
developing countries. By 2025, more than 83 percent 
will live there. At present, approximately 31 percent of 
the population of developing countries live in cities, 
although there are strong regional differences. By 2025, 
it is estimated that 57 percent of the population in 
developing countries will live in cities. The number of 
people living in cities will quadruple from 1 billion to 
4 billion. Regionally, the population in Asia will nearly 
double to over 4 billion, while that in Sub-Saharan 
Africa will more than triple from 420 million in 1985 to 
nearly 1.3 billion by 2025 (Table 1). The number of 
malnourished will rise from the current level of 750 
million to over 1 billion. 
In addition to population growth, income growth 
also increases the demand for food. Even with modest 
income growth in developing countries, the demand for 
food in 2025 will be more than double current levels of 
production. Further, urbanization, in conjunction with 
income growth, will cause the character of diets to shift 
away from roots and tubers and lower quality staple 
grains to higher quality cereals, such as rice and wheat, 
livestock products, and vegetables. [See Mitchell and 
Ingco, 1993, Chapter V, for an excellent review.] With 
massive urbanization will come increased need for 
markets and basic infrastructure as well as for urban 
oriented food security policies. 
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Table 1. Global Population and Distribution Patterns 
Year World 
Developed Developing Sub-Saharan Latin Asia and West Asia- 
Countries Countries Africa America the Pacific North Africa 
POPULATION (millions) 
1960 3,019 964 2,055 209 218 1,505 123 
1985 4,855 1,210 3,645 421 404 2,575 245 
2010 7,191 1,365 5,826 916 631 3,810 469 
(r, 2025 8,467 1,422 7,045 1,296 761 4,379 609 
DISTRIBUTION (percentage) 
1960 100.0 31.9 68.1 6.9 7.2 49.8 4.1 
1985 100.0 24.9 75.1 8.7 8.3 53.0 5.0 
2010 100.0 19.0 81.0 12.7 8.8 53.0 6.5 
2025 100.0 16.8 83.2 15.3 9.0 51.7 7.2 
Source: CGIAR. Technical Advisory Committee. 1990. “A Possible Expansion of the CGIAR.” Paper AGR/TAC:IAR/ 
90/24. TAC Secretariat, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy. 
Most observers also agree that there will be wide 
regional differences in the severity of hunger and mal- 
nutrition. All agree that Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia will face particularly difficult problems. Let us 
recall that by 2025 these two regions alone will ap- 
proach a population of 3 billion people. 
The Supply Side-The Divergent Views 
Perceptions of the capacity of the world to meet 
the above challenges vary widely. On the optimistic 
side are analysts who use global projection models based 
on past trends, which basically conclude that on a 
global basis the world can feed itself until at least 2010. 
The clearest and most comprehensive presentation of 
this view is by Mitchell and Ingco. At the opposite end 
of the spectrum is the most recent Worldwatch Insti- 
tute study by Brown and Kane. Reading Mitchell and 
Ingco and then Brown and Kane one after the other is 
a study in contrasts which makes one wonder whether 
they are talking about the same planet. 
Between these two poles are two other views. One 
I call the conventional scenario which argues that the 
challenge is serious indeed, requiring developing coun- 
tries to increase significantly their capacity to feed 
themselves and in a sustainable fashion. The percep- 
tion is that it can be done: but, if current investments 
in agricultural development and productivity improve- 
ment are not maintained or increased, the world will 
spin toward the Brown-Kane model. A fourth wild- 
card scenario is a hypothesis presented by Ian 
Car-r&hers called “Going, Going, Gone! Tropical Agri- 
culture as We Knew It,” which argues that developing 
countries will not be able to meet their growing urban 
cereal demands and that the developed countries must 
fill the gap with greatly expanded trade. 
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I begin by presenting the conventional view and 
then turn to the other three scenarios. 
Scenario 1: The Conventional View 
The challenge facing world agriculture is enor- 
mous. World food production has to more than double. 
Until the middle of the twentieth century, expansion 
of cultivated area roughly kept pace with population 
growth. In the last forty years, the doubling of cereal 
output came from three sources-area expansion, 
increased intensity of land use (mainly through ex- 
panded irrigation), and yield increases. While irri- 
gated area more than doubled from 1950 to 1980, its 
rate of growth has since slowed substantially as has 
area expansion in rainfed areas. The current view is 
that the next doubling of food production must come 
primarily from increased productivity (i.e. yield). Al- 
ready increasing productivity in many developing coun- 
tries is putting stress on the natural resource base- 
in some countries as much land is lost to erosion and 
salinization as is brought into production through ir- 
rigation or area expansion. 
Therefore, the difficult challenge facing world ag- 
riculture is to double production on the same land 
base while maintaining or, hopefully, improving the 
natural resource base. These are the twin challenges 
of creating environmentally-sustainable production sys- 
tems-productivity improvement and improved man- 
agement of natural resources. 
The aggregate challenge is staggering enough: but, 
when we begin to disaggregate food demand, the task 
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is more complicated. As noted, rising incomes and 
urbanization shift the composition of food demand. 
Consumers demand more diverse and higher-quality 
diets and need foods that can be transported and stored. 
While yields of some cereals, such as wheat and rice, 
have doubled in the last thirty years, yields of most 
other developing country crops-such as maize, cas- 
sava, sorghum, millet, beans, and edible legumes-have 
shown less rapid increases. To double again wheat 
and rice yields and more than double yields of other 
basic food products will be problematic without in- 
creased research and development efforts. While bio- 
technology holds the promise of significant genetic 
improvements, that promise is becoming reality much 
more slowly than earlier forecasts suggested. 
This scenario implicitly views the food supply prob- 
lem as basically a nationalistic one (i.e. countries are 
responsible for their own food security). This is gen- 
erally translated to mean responsible for their own food 
production. Trade enters the scenario in a limited 
way. If food demands double, grain consumption-of 
wheat, rice, and maize-will increase from 1.9 billion 
metric tons to 3.8 billion metric tons. Trade is now 
around 200 million metric tons, or approximately 10 
percent of the supply,. and is not likely to grow as a 
percentage. If developing countries are to grow their 
own food, and if population increases 2 percent per 
year, then their food production must rise by 2 percent 
per year. 
Scenario 2: The Optimists 
Analysts have been projecting world food supply 
and demand balances for decades. In their simplest 
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form, rates of population growth are added to rates of 
income growth, modified by the income elasticity of the 
demand for food, to project a rate of growth in food 
needs (i.e. demand). This rate is then compared to 
rates of growth in productivity (i.e. production), usually 
made up of an estimate of new land availability plus 
projected yield increases. These models, therefore, are 
‘basically projections of two compounding growth rates. 
Any deviation between these rates either leads to food 
gaps or surpluses and the difference increases the 
further the projection. If the model has endogenous 
prices, then real prices either rise or fall. Over a twenty- 
five year time horizon a one-tenth of 1 percent differ- 
ence leads to substantial divergence. In reality, of 
course, food gaps or food surpluses do not occur be- 
cause prices in the marketplace equilibrate quantity 
supplied to quantity demanded. Thus, the strong fo- 
cus on the direction of real prices of food over future 
periods. 
One such model deserves our attention here. 
Mitchell and Ingco have produced a substantial and 
controversial paper in ‘The World Food Outlook. n After 
reviewing past predictions of global food shortages over 
the last several decades, Mitchell and Ingco concluded 
that the world has really done quite well. Using three 
indicators-real food prices, calories available to con- 
sumers, and per capita food production-they concluded 
that, overall, the world was better fed in 1990 than in 
1960. Real food prices, except for a blip from 1972 to 
1974, have continued their century-long decline. “Per 
capita calorie supplies in developing countries rose by 
27 percent from 1961-63 to 1987-89” (Mitchell and 
Ingco 1993, p. 20) and overall per capita food supplies 
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“increased at a steady pace since 1961-63” (p. 23). 
Their basic question is, what can we expect to 
201 O? Their model is based on two critical assump- 
tions. The first is that the global population growth 
rate will decline from 1.74 percent in 1994 to 1.4 per- 
cent in 2010. The second is that world grain produc- 
tion will grow at 2 percent per annum from now until 
2010. The result of their baseline simulation model is 
that global food production increases will more than 
keep pace with increases in demand. Food imports by 
developing countries will increase by more than 4 per- 
cent per annum, doubling imports by 2010; but these 
will easily be provided by expanded exports from devel- 
oped countries and reduced net imports by formerly 
centrally planned economies. 
Among the study’s conclusions are: 
1. “The simulation results strongly suggest that the 
outlook for the world food situation is good, de- 
spite regional problems” (p. 151). 
2. “It should become increasingly easy to meet the 
world’s demand for grain if past trends in produc- 
tion and consumption continue” (p. 175). 
3. “The most important conclusion to come from our 
analysis is that the world food system has many 
options to meet future demand” (p. 175). 
4. Mitchell and Ingco’s iinal paragraph: 
The world food situation has improved 
dramatically during the past thirty years 
and the prospects are very good that the 
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twenty-year period from 1990 to 20 10 
will see further gains. However, these 
gains depend on continued increases in 
food production along the trends of the 
past. This will not occur automaticallv, 
rather it will reauire continued invest- 
ments in research to increase cron vields 
and in other factors of Droduction. If 
past crop yield trends continue and if 
population growth rates slow as pro- 
jected, then the gains in the world food 
situation seen during the past thirty years 
should continue. If Malthus is ultimately 
to be correct in his warning that popu- 
lation will outstrip food production, then 
at least we can say: “Malthus must wait” 
(p. 232). [Emphasis added.] 
Other studies-such as “Agriculture: Towards 
2010” by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) and an International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) paper by Mark W. Rosegrant 
and Mercedita Agcaoili entitled “Global and Regional 
Food Demand, Supply, and Trade Prospects to 2010”- 
reach similar, though not identical, conclusions. The 
FAO study uses the same population growth rate for 
2010 (i.e. 1.4 percent), but a slightly lower rate of glo- 
bal production increase (i.e. 1.8 percent). The study 
concludes that per capita calorie supplies will rise and 
the absolute numbers of people suffering chronic un- 
dernutrition will decline. Production increases for grains 
are projected to be 2.2 percent per annum, made up of 
a 1.4 percent per annum increase in yield and a 0.8 
percent per annum increase in area harvested. 
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Rosegrant and Agcaoili use an IFPRI simulation 
model to project to 2010. Aggregate simulation re- 
sults suggest declining or constant real prices of major 
food commodities, which suggest optimism for future 
aggregate food supplies. As with the Mitchell and 
Ingco and the FAO studies, the IFPRI study also points 
to potential regional problems, particularly in Sub- 
Saharan Afritia, but in general it is upbeat. 
Their conclusion is: 
If governments and the international 
community maintain (or renew) their 
commitment to agricultural growth 
through policy reform and sustained, 
cost-effective investment in agricultural 
research, extension, irrigation and wa- 
ter development, human capital, and 
rural infrastructure, there will be no 
overwhelming pressure on aggregate 
world food supplies from rising popula- 
tion and incomes. Projected per capita 
availability of food will increase and real 
world food prices will be stable or de- 
clining for key food crops. However, 
these aggregate price trends conceal 
emerging problems at the regional and 
country level, which show that there will 
continue to be problems in getting food 
to those who need it most (Rosegrant 
and Agcaoili 1994, p. 40-41). 
Thus, these models project that growth in global 
production will keep pace with global demand. In 
fact, they argue that production could grow faster than 
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2 percent if land currently held out of production in 
developed countries returns to production. The con- 
clusion is that supply will continue to press on de- 
mand leading to a continuation of the decline in real 
grain prices which has persisted with few exceptions 
for the last 100 years. They conclude that there will 
be no global world food problem as aggregate supply 
will be equal to or greater than aggregate demand at 
constant or lower real prices. Finally, none of the 
studies sees resource degradation as a critical issue. 
In fact, the Mitchell and Ingco study suggests less land 
would be needed. 
They do, however, admit that there will be pockets 
of problems such as in Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia, particularly where there will be problems of mal- 
nutrition. They identify this as a problem of access to 
food, which is a poverty problem not a food problem. 
If pressed, the supporters of these models will admit 
that a 1.8 percent to 2 percent output growth assump- 
tion is critical, and that there will, therefore, be a role 
for research and technology development; but they do 
not see global food supplies as a crisis in the next 
decade or two. They are generally silent about the 
longer- term. 
Scenario 3: The Pessimists 
At the opposite end of the spectrum we find Brown 
and Kane in Full House: Reassessing the Earth’s Popu- 
lation Carrying Capacity. This book is in stark con- 
trast to the Mitchell and Ingco analysis. The basic 
premise is that the 1990s mark the beginning of a new 
era where it will be much more difficult to expand food 
output. 
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Many knew that this time would eventu- 
ally come, that at some point the limits of 
the earths natural systems, the cumula- 
tive effects of environmental degradation 
on cropland productivity, and the shrink- 
ing backlog of yield-raising technologies 
would slow the record growth in food pro- 
duction in recent decades. But because 
no one knew exactly when or how this 
would happen, the food prospect was 
widely debated. Now we can see that sev- 
eral constraints are emerging simulta- 
neously to slow the growth in food pro- 
duction (Brown and Kane 1994, p. 22). 
The “facts” acdording to Brown and Kane are dif- 
ferent from Mitchell and Ingco. Brown and Kane say 
grain production expanded at 3 percent per year from 
1950 to 1984, but the rate of growth dropped to scarcely 
1 percent annually during the period 1984-93. Recall 
Mitchell and Ingco projected a continuation of the 2 
percent per year growth in production that occurred in 
the 1980s. Further, Brown and Kane argue that pro- 
duction of fish has reached its biological limit and the 
carrying capacity of rangelands has been exceeded, 
requiring future food needs to be met by only the crop- 
land food system, whereas before it was met by all 
three-fish, livestock, and crops. 
Therefore, Brown and Kane argue future supply 
trends will be subject to six new constraints: 
1. The shrinking backlog of unused agricultural 
technology. 
2. The growing human demands that are pressing 
against the limits of what fisheries and rangelands 
can contribute to increase food needs. 
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3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
The demands for water that are pressing against 
hydrologic limits. 
The declining response of crops in many countries 
to additional fertilizer application. 
The substantial losses of cropland to industrial- 
ization and urbanization. 
The “social disintegration, often fed by rapid popu- 
lation growth and environmental degradation [that] 
is undermining many national governments and 
their efforts to expand food production” (p. 24). 
On this last point, Brown and Kane cite exten- 
sively a chilling article by Robert Kaplan entitled “The 
Coming Anarchy.” 
Full House presents quantitative information to 
back-up these basic propositions. The food production 
increases have slowed perceptibly in the last ten years 
and may slow even more in the future. Per capita 
grain production has fallen from a peak of 346 kilo- 
grams per capita in 1984 to 303 kilograms per capita 
in 1993. World grain stock, as a percentage of produc- 
tion, is at an all time low. Relatively little land is 
currently being held out of production in the United 
States and the European Union, and what is out is of 
low productivity. Bringing all this land back into pro- 
duction would “expand the world gram area by only 
1.6 percent, not half enough to get it back to the his- 
torical high reached in 198 ln (p. 99). 
Further, China is losing nearly 1 million hectares 
or 1 percent of its cropland per year to industrializa- 
tion. Brown and Kane predict that China will follow a 
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similar path to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, where 
their combined grain areas decreased from 8 million 
hectares to 4 million hectares from 1950 to 1990. 
Thus China, in their scenario, will experience a 66 
million metric ton reduction in grain production from 
1990 to 2030 and an increase of 2 10 million metric 
tons in imports-more than total world trade in the 
1990s. 
These facts plus others-declining fertilizer use: 
a falling off in yield increases in recent years in many 
countries (world grain yields increased 2.3 percent 
per year from 1950 to 1984, but only 1 percent per 
year from 1984 to 1993): declining investments in 
agricultural research; and increasing environmental 
pressures-lead Brown and Kane to conclude that the 
world is close to exceeding its carrying capacity. Their 
analysis suggests that by 2030 world grain import 
needs will “exceed exportable supplies by 526 million 
tons, an amount approaching the current grain 
consumption in the United States and China com- 
bined” (p. 188). Their bottom line is that the growing 
imbalance between food and people can only be re- 
dressed by frontally attacking the population issue. 
In sum, if Brown and Kane were to paraphrase Mitchell 
and Ingco’s concluding sentence, it could read “Malthus 
is here.” 
Scenario 4: The Developed Countries 
F’ill the Gap 
The most radical scenario is one put forward by 
Carruthers, a professor at Wye College, in “Going. 
Going, Gone! Tropical Agriculture as We Knew It.” 
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Carruthers’ view is that our traditional model of devel- 
oped countries (i.e. rich) supplying the world with 
manufactured goods and financial services while the 
developing countries (i.e. poor) provide primary prod- 
ucts-such as food, natural resource products, and 
minerals-is not sustainable. Can-&hers’ view is that 
in the long-run developing countries will produce manu- 
factured goods and trade them for food from developed 
countries. His argument in simplified terms runs as 
follows: 
1. Carruthers is convinced that the tropics are inca- 
pable of producing enough basic foodstuffs for bur- 
geoning cities in the developing world-where popu- 
lation is estimated to be 4 billion by 2025-in the 
long-run. The fragile tropical and subtropical 
environments will be lucky to support the remain- 
ing 50 percent that still subsist from the land. 
2. The trend has already started; it is developed coun- 
tries-the United States, Canada, Europe, and 
Australia-which export food to developing coun- 
tries and increasingly import labor intensive 
manufactured goods. 
3. Production increase potentials are greater in the 
temperate zone because of better technology and 
significant areas of land held out of production. 
Therefore, developed countries can provide in- 
creased supplies through trade. 
4. If the scenario occurs with developing countries 
exporting manufactured goods (i.e. from labor 
abundance), urbanites in developing countries will 
have enough income to import basic foods (i.e. 
grains). 
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The implications of this scenario are enormous. If 
the additional 3 billion urban dwellers are to be fed by 
trade, exports of grain will have to increase 4 times 
from 200 million metric tons to 800 million metric tons, 
assuming minimum consumption of 200 kilograms per 
capita, in next thirty years. This is-physically, bio- 
logically, and economically-a huge task. If trade does 
not expand this rapidly, the impact on food prices could 
be substantial, causing greater increases in malnutri- 
tion in poor countries. Carruthers’ paper contains no 
numbers, so it may be that the physical magnitude of 
the increases in production in developed countries 
suggested was not fully comprehended. The United 
States currently provides about half of world grain 
exports. To maintain that share, US grain production 
would have to triple by 2030. 
Some Comparisons of the Scenarios 
The four scenarios presented look at the same 
“facts” and reach vastly different conclusions. The rea- 
sons for the differences, despite all the rhetoric, reside 
in four projection parameters: 
1. The rate of increase in biological cereal yields to 
be expected over the next fifteen to thirty years. 
2. The amount of new land to be added to or lost 
from agricultural production. 
3. The amount of land subject to increased intensi- 
fication primarily through irrigation. 
4. The impact of environmental degradation on food 
production capacity. 
Mitchell and Ingco assume a continuation of the 
rate of increase in production of the last several de- 
cades. Ninety percent of that increase resulted from 
yield increases. In their terms, yield is output per unit 
of land, which includes the impact of both biological 
yield increases and intensification. Presumably both 
the rate of growth in biological yield and irrigation is 
assumed to continue at the same rate as during 1960- 
90. Therefore, the assumption with respect to increased 
land area appears to be close to zero. They minimize 
any significant negative impact on production of re- 
source degradation. 
On the other extreme, Brown and Kane argue that 
biological yield growth has slowed to about 1 percent 
per year in the last decade and may decline further. 
Herein lies the major difference-a 1 percent difference 
in a compound growth rate over thirty years makes an 
enormous difference at the end of the projection pe- 
riod. Further, Brown and Kane argue that land lost 
from agricultural production, coupled with increased 
urban competition for water, will lead to a projected 
decline in irrigated acreage. Environmental degrada- 
tion will further constrain production increases. 
Carruthers makes no explicit presumptions about any 
of these parameters, but must implicitly be assuming 
low yield growth in developing countries, very high rates 
of yield growth plus expanded land area in developed 
countries, and environmental constraints mainly in the 
tropics and subtropics. 
The conventional scenario argues that biological 
yields must increase to about 2 percent per annum to 
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replace the contributions made by area expansion and 
intensification in the last three decades. These yield 
increases must be accomplished without degrading the 
environment further. 
All scenarios recognize the need for sustained or 
increased investments in research and technology de- 
velopment. 
One must be somewhat cautious in assuming that 
future biological yield increases at past rates will be 
easy. Research by the International Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI) and the International Center for the Improve- 
ment of Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT) found significant 
slowing in the rate of yield increases of rice and wheat 
under experimental conditions. Nor should we be blase 
about area or irrigation expansion. While the area of 
potentially useable arable land seems large, its poten- 
tial for production has been seriously questioned in a 
recent study by Gershon Feder and Andrew Keck en- 
titled “Increasing Competition for Land and Water Re- 
sources: A Global Perspective.” 
The trade implications of the four scenarios are 
also widely different. Carruthers appears to be arguing 
that, given population increases in developing coun- 
tries, exports from developed countries would need to 
increase by 400 percent to possibly 800 million metric 
tons by 2025. Brown and Kane have export require- 
ments which appear to exceed 700 million metric tons. 
The Mitchell-Ingco model sees a doubling of developing 
country imports by 2010 and, presumably, if the mod- 
els were projected further, developing country imports 
could double again by 2025. This would imply a tri- 
pling of cereal trade. Finally, the conventional scenario 
would imply a doubling of cereal trade. 
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The first three scenarios raise two critical issues. 
First, the capacity of the developed countries and, 
possibly, the formerly centrally planned economies to 
achieve the required rate of increase, particularly given 
environmental concerns and resource limits. Second, 
the physical capacity of developing country infrastruc- 
ture to handle the volume of trade projected. All of 
these models-Mitchell-Ingco, Brown-Kane, and 
Car-r&hers-are very cavalier in assuming that these 
two barriers can be overcome. 
Of course, no one knows who will be right. Pro- 
jections thirty years ahead, particularly those by econo- 
mists, are invariably wrong. This is partly because of 
questionable assumptions, limited models, and poor 
information, but also because a dynamic world economy 
is self-adjusting since it does not tolerate disequilibrium 
easily. 
The Consequences for the Future 
While my own views tend to be more consistent 
with the conventional view than any others, this is not 
crucially important. Regardless of who is correct, the 
productivity-food production challenge for the globe is 
very substantial. Given the agreement on the demand 
side, all scenarios “require” at least a 2 percent or 
more per year increase in global food production. 
However, each scenario would have a different distri- 
bution of required relative increases. At one extreme, 
Can-&hers places almost the entire burden of produc- 
tion increases on developed countries, and seems to 
imply a rate of increase approaching 4 percent per 
year-a rate never before accomplished. Mitchell and 
Ingco clearly imply a larger rate of increase in devel- 
22 
oped countries. The conventional view places more of the 
burden on developing countries and implies that virtually 
all of these increases must come from biological yield 
increases. Brown and Kane are skeptical about it hap- 
pening at all. Under all scenarios biological yield in- 
creases accomplished over the last thirty years must be 
at least maintained or, better yet, increased. 
Several other points need to be made: 
1. The global requirements for production systems to 
be non-degrading to the environment (i.e. sustain- 
able production systems) increases an already enor- 
mous research and development challenge. Few 
systems have sustained increases of over 2 per- 
cent per year, and these have often been at the 
expense of resource degradation. 
2. Sources of increased rainfed land are limited, and 
the rate of increase of irrigated land has slowed 
considerably because of rising costs and the threat 
of long-term salinization. Therefore, production 
increases must come from yield increases. How 
difficult will it be to get 250 bushels per acre of 
corn or to increase the average irrigated rice yields 
in developing countries from 3.5 tons per hectare 
to 7 tons per hectare? Doubling sorghum yields 
in the Sahel from 500 kilograms to 1 metric ton 
per hectare is not going to help much in meeting 
global food security needs no matter how impor- 
tant it is to the Sahel. 
3. The mix of crops will need to change to produce 
more tradable surpluses which are transportable 
and storable. Further, the increased foreign ex- 
change earnings required by developing countries 
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for imports require a much more open trading 
system than we now have, even given the advances 
made during the Uruguay Round of negotiations 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GATT). 
4. Even increasing production does not solve the 
malnutrition problem which will surely grow. It is 
a problem of access and income. 
Further, we must recognize that the agricultural 
productivity issue is not just an issue of food supplies 
or even of biological food security. Let me make three 
quick, but very important, points in this regard. First, 
in the poorest countries of the world, the agricultural 
sector remains the most important, both in terms of 
employment and income generation. Increased produc- 
tivity in subsistence and smallholder agriculture is a 
powerful engine of labor intensive growth, income im- 
provement, and better access to food. It is a major 
contributor to poverty alleviation and equity improve- 
ment. 
Second, more of the poorest of the poor and the 
malnourished currently live in low-potential areas than 
in high-potential areas, and rural numbers far exceed 
urban numbers so far (Pin&up-Andersen and Pandya- 
Larch 1994b). Thus, improvement in productivity in 
agriculture in both low- and high-potential areas has 
the multiple impact of increasing production, reducing 
poverty, reducing malnutrition, and generating growth, 
thereby improving food security broadly defined. Agri- 
cultural development is not just increasing cereal yields. 
Further, for the growing number of urban poor, ever- 
declining real food prices are a positive contribution to 
reducing malnutrition and poverty. 
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Third, increased yield per unit of land, particu- 
larly biological yield increases, reduces pressure on 
fragile environments. Feder and Keck argue that * . ..ev- 
ery 0.1 percent of yield increase in the period 20 10 to 
2025 ‘substitutes’ for about 25 million hectares of 
rainfed cropland” (p. 22). Further, given that agricul- 
tural production systems are dominant users of the 
arable landscape, attention to environmental issues in 
the development of sustainable production systems is 
an indispensable component of any successful future 
strategy. 
Concluding Comments 
The frightening part of thfs story to me is that, 
while the challenge just outlined is, in my view, critical 
and immediate, funds to support agricultural develop- 
ment and productivity improvement are being reduced 
in developed countries, and aid agencies and interna- 
tional development institutions are reducing the share 
of resources going toward agriculture. This trend is 
made worse by the overall decline in development as- 
sistance. Even the interest of developing country gov- 
ernments in agricultural development appears to be in 
steep decline. There is at least a twenty-year lag be- 
tween initiating strategic research and significant in- 
creases in production in farmers’ fields. Twenty years 
from now there will be 2 billion more people to feed 
and most of them will be in developing country cities. 
To not recognize the challenge and increase efforts is 
bad enough, but it is much worse to allow existing 
research capacity to erode, 
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Explanations for the apparent neglect of a critical 
problem abound: the short time span of attention of 
politicians; perceptions of over-production and surpluses 
in rich countries: protectionist domestic agricultural 
policies, which reduce incentive prices in developing 
countries; aid fatigue; fiscal crises in countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- 
ment; the end of the Cold War, which reduced the 
urgency for development assistance; and on and on. 
Regardless of the reason, the consequences of not 
addressing these issues now will clearly have serious 
future consequences. Unfortunately, extremely pessi- 
mistic or optimistic scenarios, both of which must be 
questioned, detract us from serious debate on this 
critical issue. The efforts of IFPRI through their 2020 
Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment are, 
therefore, to be applauded as they seek a broadly ac- 
cepted consensus on the challenges ahead. A recent 
IFPRI paper by Peter Hazell entitled “Prospects for a 
Well-Fed World” begins to move us on that direction. 
More than anything, the global community needs a 
balanced and reasonable analysis upon which to base 
critical future decisions. 
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